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INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1992, nearly one million Coloradans voted1 in
favor of amending the State Constitution to read as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado,
through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or re-
1 The precise vote in favor of Amendment 2 was 813,996 to 710,151. See Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Evans 1].
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lationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitu-
tion shall be in all respects self-executing. 2
On May 20, 1996, six Supreme Court Justices pronounced that choice
irrational.3  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined that
Amendment 2 "lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests."'4
Beyond that, Romer v. Evans5 is a bit of an enigma, not unlike
the amendment at the center of the controversy. Grand in design
and far reaching in scope, Amendment 2 sought, in the eyes of some,
to "earmark[] a group and say[ ], you will not be able to appeal to
your State legislature to improve your status."' 6 The full extent of the
amendment's impact-which existing laws it would or even
could affect-was not entirely clear. 7 Municipal ordinances
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in Boulder,8 Aspen9
and elsewhere' 0 would certainly fall,11 but what about laws of general
2 COLO CONsT. art. II, § 30(b) [hereinafter Amendment 2].
3 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
4 Id. As one prominent author commented, "It is, to say the least, not common practice
for the Court to stigmatize more than half the voters of a state as 'irrational."' Jeremy Rabkin,
The Supreme Court in the culture wars, Tim PUB. INTEREST, Sept. 1, 1996, at 3.
5 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
6 Oral Arguments at *8, 1995 WL 605822, Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), (No. 94-
1039).
7 "The parties sharply disagree on the scope of Amendment 2's provisions." Evans I,
854 P.2d at 1284 n.25; see infra note 12.
8 See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1284 (citing BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-2 to 12-1-
4 (1987)).
9 See id. (citing AsPaN, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977)).
10 Both the City and County of Denver had also enacted ordinances banning discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation. See id. (citing DENVER, CoLo., REv. MUNICInAL CODE art.
IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991)).
11 Even on this relatively small point there was some disagreement about whether the
amendment repealed those anti-discrimination laws completely or only repealed them as they
related to homosexual orientation. The court in Evans I reasoned that "[t]he precise scope of
Amendment 2 need not be determined here ... because neither the parties, nor their amici,
have contended that Amendment 2 does not prohibit the enactment of antidiscrimination laws
by state or local entities." Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1284 n.25. Compare that analysis with the
more explicit, and in this author's view, quite accurate reading of the amendment's effects:
Amendment 2 did not repeal Denver's, Aspen's, and Boulder's ordinances in toto,
but only insofar as these ordinances protected homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals
from orientation discrimination. Under the Boulder Code (as modified by Amend-
ment 2), Boulder was not permitted to discriminate against heteros[exuals] on the
basis of their orientation, but homos[exuals] and bis[exuals] were shut out of this
code's sympathetic protection.
Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203,
207 (1996).
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applicability, federal laws, and common law anti-discrimination
protections? 12
If the potential applications of this grandiose amendment were un-
clear, the ramifications of its recent downfall are equally blurry. Prior to
the decision, many municipalities across the country had adopted refer-
endums similar to Amendment 2, and Romer has now forced courts to re-
engage the debates about the constitutionality of such laws. 13 In related
areas of law, the lower courts hesitate to cite Romer at all, and when they
do, they disagree as to what specific proposition, if any, it represents. 14
12 This debate began in the Colorado courts, continued through the briefs to the United
States Supreme Court, throughout oral arguments and even into the Supreme Court's opinion.
In its final form, Justice Kennedy contended that Amendment 2 would, at a minimum, (1)
repeal existing protections granted to people based on sexual orientation in many municipali-
ties and (2) repeal and forbid all laws at all levels of the Colorado government that would
provide protections for homosexuals. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625-27. However, Justice
Kennedy went even further in suggesting: "It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the
broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of
general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private
settings." Id. at 1626. Justice Scalia in dissent countered:
[We need not resolve that dispute [of what laws would be affected], because the
Supreme Court of Colorado has resolved it for us. In Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (1994), the Colorado court stated: "It is significant to note that Colorado law
currently proscribes discrimination against persons who are not suspect classes, in-
cluding discrimination based on age .... marital or family status .... veterans'
status .... and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as smoking tobacco ..... Of
course Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect on this legislation, but seeks
only to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination laws intended to protect gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals."
Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo.
1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) [hereinafter Evans Il]) (emphasis in original).
13 In 1994 alone, measures similar to Amendment 2 passed in Cincinnati, Ohio; Lewis-
ton, Maine; Oregon City, Oregon; and Keizer, Oregon. See Pamela Coukos, Recent Develop-
ment, 29 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 581,581 n.6 (1994). The amendment passed in Cincinnati,
known as Issue 3, has already experienced quite a legal odyssey. See infra notes 60, 149-58,
239-42 and accompanying text.
14 In the aftermath of the decision, courts have cited Romer for a myriad of different
propositions. Although this Note will argue that a tentative trend is emerging and beginning to
outline the true legacy of Romer, for now it suffices to say that Romer is the mother of many
and varied progeny. See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing a
homosexual's equal protection challenge to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and
citing Romer in support of rational basis review for equal protection claims by homosexuals),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing Romer for the proposition that laws classifying groups cannot be driven solely by
animus), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997); Roe II v. Butterworth, 958
F. Supp. 1569, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Romer as support for the proposition that an anti-
prostitution statute would be struck down if "[it] was enacted merely to discriminate against
women-to impose male domination, to demean or degrade women, or to discriminatorily
'protect' women in a paternalistic manner.. ." ); Swage v. Inn Phila. and Creative Remodel-
ing, Inc., No. Civ.A. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996) (refusing to
rule out the possibility of same-sex sexual harassment claims, in part, because the Romer Court
stated that "homosexuals cannot be denied protection against discrimination available to all
others").
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Nowhere is Romer's legacy of confusion greater than on the infa-
mous Bowers v. Hardwick15 and the staggered homosexual rights move-
ment that it had left in its wake. 16 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in Romer, found Bowers entirely unworthy of mention. 17 Jus-
tice Scalia in dissent, on the other hand, concluded, "Bowers alone suf-
fices to answer all constitutional objections [to Amendment 2]." 18 Some
commentators suggest Romer merely distinguished Bowers;19 others sug-
gest Romer implicitly overturned Bowers.20 In short, there is little agree-
ment among scholars or judges as to the present status of Bowers.
After Romer, we are, at the least, left with something of a paradox.
Michael Hardwick, by constitutional fiat, must always remain free and
politically unfettered from seeking civil rights laws and protections for
his sexual orientation.21 Yet, if he acts on that very orientation,22 the
state can prosecute and imprison him. This Note attempts to solve, or at
least explore and explain, this apparent paradox by engaging the three
15 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Supreme Court held that the state of Georgia
could, in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution, criminally proscribe the act
of sodomy at least as applied to homosexuals. See id. at 189.
16 See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MriQ4I L. Rav. 511,
512-13 (1992) (describing Bowers as "a harsh blow to the gay rights movement" that left gay-
rights advocates scrambling to find new "legal theories to protect gay men and lesbians from
discrimination"); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. Rv.
4, 70-71 (1996) (calling Bowers "one of the few genuinely humiliating decisions in American
constitutional law").
17 One author hypothesized: "[w]e might even say that the Court's silence on Hardwick
is under ordinary circumstances an unacceptable exercise of judicial power." Sunstein, supra
note 16, at 65.
18 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 See Amar, supra note 11, at 227. Professor Amar's essay also illustrates the extraordi-
nary level of disagreement on this issue. Amar not only argued that Romer did not directly
alter or engage Bowers but even went so far as to call Justice Scalia's analysis (that Bowers
directly answered all issues raised by Romer) "one of the most troubling passages ever to
appear in modem U.S. Reports." Id. at 231.
20 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 65-71 (discussing the many possible consequences of
Romer and hypothesizing that Romer seriously weakened Bowers and that the Court will soon
overturn it).
21 At the very least, the state cannot deny Hardwick those rights by a state constitutional
amendment with the breadth of Amendment 2.
22 Although there has been, and continues to be up through the writing of this Note,
much debate on the issue of whether persons of homosexual orientation necessarily engage in
homosexual conduct, one author puts it this way: "[Dleclaring oneself a lesbian, barring a
religious oath of celibacy, does seem to imply that one will engage in sexual activity with
women; at the very least it implies a desire to engage in such activity. To claim otherwise is
intellectually and emotionally dishonest." Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Doing the Nasty: An Argu-
ment for Bringing Same-Sex Erotic Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CoemN.L L. Rv.
1135, 1172 (1996). Courts have addressed the question somewhat differently, but have come
to essentially the same conclusion. See infra note 58; see also S. Rep. No. 103-112, at 284
(1993) (maintaining that it would be "irrational ... to develop military personnel policies on
the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain celibate").
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different emerging explanations for Romer as it is interpreted against the
backdrop of Bowers: (1) Romer implicitly overruled Bowers and the ho-
mosexual rights movement won a momentous victory with far-reaching
effects for civil rights and constitutional notions of privacy; (2) Romer
properly distinguished Bowers because there is no inherent conflict in
finding a conduct-based prohibition to be constitutionally sound and a
status-based deprivation to be constitutionally infirm when the two
clauses in question (Due Process and Equal Protection) occupy two en-
tirely different spheres of constitutional law; and (3) Bowers has emerged
entirely unscathed from Romer and the two cases will work together as
courts construe Romer to stand for little more than rational basis review
for homosexual equal protection challenges.
Part I of this Note reviews the underpinnings of Bowers and the
subsequent state of homosexual rights in the ten years leading up to
Romer. Part II examines Romer's mechanics and rationale. Part III ex-
plores, through the three different interpretations outlined above, the im-
pact that Romer has had on Bowers, on homosexual rights and on the
specific possibility (or impossibility as the case may be) of either an
equal protection claim or suspect/quasi-suspect status for homosexuals.
In Part IV, this Note concludes that unless and until a new Supreme
Court case injects life into Romer, the case will be whittled down to the
bare legal propositions that (1) homosexuals are not a suspect class and
(2) their equal protection challenges deserve only rational basis review-
thereby dooming nearly all future challenges by homosexuals.
I. IN THE BEGINNING
A. BowERs v. HADwIcK
Few questions of homosexual rights, conduct, or status have ever
reached the Supreme Court.23 In fact, prior to Romer, many regarded
Bowers as "the gay case." 24 But an inappropriate name it was, as Bowers
generated far more than its fair share of acrimony and dissent. A quick
review of the case explains why.
At issue in Bowers was the following Georgia statute:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual activity involving the
23 Until the Court decided to hear Romer in 1995, it had taken no questions concerning
homosexual conduct or status with the exception of Bowers. See Tracy T. Kenton, Quasi-
Suspect Status for Homosexuals in Equal Protection Analysis: Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 12 GA. ST. U. L. Rv. 873, 873-74 (1996). The Courts of
Appeals, however, have heard several claims by homosexuals discharged from the military.
See infra notes 57-58.
24 Scott N. Thrig, Note, Sexual Orientation in Law School: Experiences of Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Law Students, 14 LAw & Ihm. 1. 555, 555 (1996) (emphasis added).
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sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than 20 years .... 25
The respondent in the case, Michael Hardwick, had been ticketed for
public drinking but failed to appear in court for a hearing. 26 Although
Hardwick paid the fine after learning that he had missed his court date,
the police obtained a warrant for his arrest and went to his house.27 En-
tering through an open door, Officer Torick found Hardwick in the bed-
room engaging in "mutual oral sex" with another man.28 The officer
arrested both men for violating Georgia's criminal sodomy statute.29
The other man eventually pled guilty to a lesser charge, and "the District
Attorney decided not to present the [Hardwick sodomy] matter to [a]
grand jury unless further evidence developed."'30 Michael Hardwick,
however, brought a declaratory judgment action in federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of the statute at least as applied to con-
sensual sodomy.31 The district court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim, but the court of appeals reversed.32 The Supreme Court
then reversed the court of appeals, upholding the criminal sodomy
statute. 33
Its strange procedural nature aside, Bowers is relatively clear and
concise in its legal reasoning.3 4 Justice White, writing the plurality opin-
25 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
26 There is evidence that Hardwick's public drinking offense was a fabricated charge-a
form of police harassment. For the intriguing and, generally upsetting, background details of
the case, see PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONICTIONS: Slraa=N AMERICANS WHO
FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREmME COURT 395-96 (1988); Peter Irons, Interview with
Michael Hardwick, in LESBIANs, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 125-31 (William B. Rubenstein,
ed., 1993); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1643, 1652-53 (1993) (describing the background details of the case).
27 See IRONS, COURAGE OF THEIm CONVICTIONS, supra note 26, at 394-95.
28 Id. at 395.
29 See id. at 396.
30 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 188-89.
33 See id.
34 Many, including the dissenting Justices, questioned the validity of the legal reasoning
for among other reasons its failure to account for the twin facts that (1) the statute on its face
only applied to sodomy (not just homosexual sodomy) and (2) the act took place in the privacy
of the home where Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and its progeny provide special
protection. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Those challenges,
however, are in essence challenges to the premise of the Bowers majority-that the Court
would decide the case at the lowest possible level of controversy (the act in question) and not
in terms of the statute as broadly written, nor by notions of privacy broadly construed like
private, consensual sex between adults.
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ion,35 began his line of reasoning with the traditional premise that consti-
tutional rights not explicit in the text of the Constitution must be in some
sense "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 36 or "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition. '37 While it was, and still is, far from
clear what rights qualify under these tests, at the very least the right in
question must not have been proscribed by a majority of the states for
most of this country's history.38 Sodomy, however, was a criminal of-
fense in all of the original thirteen states,39 in thirty-two of the thirty-
seven states at the time the Union enacted the Fourteenth Amendment,40
in all fifty states until 1961 and in twenty-four states in 1986 at the time
of Hardwick's litigation.41 Therefore, Justice White asserted, "to claim
that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best, facetious." 42
But Bowers is remembered for more than its narrow holding. At the
conclusion of the opinion, Justice White, in one of the more famous
passages of recent constitutional law, left no doubt that the criminal sod-
omy statute satisfied rational basis review:
[R]espondent asserts that there must be a rational basis
for the law and that there is none in this case other than
the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate of
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unac-
ceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to
35 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell each wrote concurring opinions. Powell's
opinion is the more noteworthy for two reasons: (1) He insisted that any evidence that people
were actually being charged, convicted and imprisoned under this statute "would create a seri-
ous Eighth Amendment issue," Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring), and (2) He
originally cast his vote with what became the dissent and then changed his mind at the last
moment. See Chris Bull, A Hard Look at Hardwick: The Supreme Court Came Close to Void-
ing Sodomy Laws in 1986, According to Newly Revealed Documents, ADvoc., June 29, 1993,
at 31, 38.
36 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
37 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East'Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
38 For a subtle variation of this analysis, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122
n.2 (1988) (accepting the potential existence of "an interest society has traditionally thought
important without protecting it" but holding "[such an interest] must at least exclude ... a
societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest").
39 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
40 See id. at 193.
41 See id. at 193-94. Some commentators, however, have raised concerns (cleverly turn-
ing the majority's own line of reasoning against it) about the ambiguous meaning of the word
sodomy at the time the states enacted those statutes-particularly on the difficult question of
whether oral sex (the offense in question in Bowers) was included in the definition of sodomy.
See Bruce, supra note 22, at 1142-43.
42 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
1997]
172 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
support the law. The law, however, is constantly based
on notions of morality, and if all laws representing es-
sentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed.43
Withering dissents, led principally by Justice Blackmun, took um-
brage at the majority's reliance on traditional mores as the sole justifica-
tion for the law in question. Justice Blackmun likened this reliance to
naming "racial animus" as the justification for a race-based classifica-
tion.44 He thundered:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that [it] is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have van-
ished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.45
The arguments of the dissenters, however, only cemented the meaning of
the dispute and the proposition that would become tied to Bowers: tradi-
tional morality, and traditional morality alone, sufficed as a rational con-
stitutional justification for a criminal law.46
B. THE EFFECTS OF BOWERS ON THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The move to condemn Bowers was swift and sharp,4 7 but for nearly
ten years it remained good law. 48 Bowers not only dealt a severe blow to
43 Id. at 196.
44 See id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 199 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv.
457, 469 (1897)).
46 Blackmun attacked this point in vain: "But the fact that moral judgments expressed by
statutes like § 16-6-2 [Georgia criminal sodomy statute] may be 'natural and familiar
... ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States."' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))).
47 For a survey of the severe academic criticism the case received, see John Charles
Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Height-
ened Equal Protection Scrutiny after Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REv. 375 (1990); Nan
D. Hunter, Life after Hardwick, 27 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 531 (1992); Jeb Rubenfield, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. RaV. 737, 770, 799-801 (1989); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers
v. Hardwick, Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 648 (1987). Further-
more, although this author doubts the public's ability to interpret the Constitution, polls con-
firmed that 57% of the people questioned disagreed with the decision. See Irons, Interview
with Michael Hardwick, supra note 26, at 131 (citing a 1986 Newsweek poll after Bowers).
48 At least in the sense that it was never overruled or seriously weakened by subsequent
decisions. It has, however, been distinguished or explained on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 82 n.2 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing
[Vol. 7:165
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the gay rights movement, it also "changed the course of gay rights litiga-
tion."'49 After Bowers, homosexual conduct was clearly proscribable, but
homosexual status was still a tabula rasa. The status/conduct distinction,
therefore, became the "driving force in shaping new constitutional chal-
lenges to discrimination against gays and lesbians." 50 As one author re-
cently explained:
Bowers v. Hardwick force[d] pro-gay litigators to evade
any focus in the courtroom on their lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual clients' sexual activity. It foreclose[d] the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny in the substantive due process
arena, force[d] gay-rights advocates to avoid privacy
claims in their challenges to laws that discriminate
against homosexuals, and all but necessitate[d] the use
of the status/conduct distinction in equal protection
cases.
51
These new tactics generally enjoyed little success. With few exceptions,
the lower courts interpreted Bowers as posing an "insurmountable barrier
to the claim that homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class."'52 Even worse, after Bowers, sodomy became "the behavior that
defines the class."'53 On the whole, lower federal courts, with only Bow-
ers to use as guidance on questions of homosexual rights, imported the
avowedly conduct-based case 54 and its rationale into the equal protection
realm, thus eradicating an important distinction many thought should and
did exist.55 Almost inevitably then, homosexuals' status-based equal
protection claims, after being relegated to the lowest level of scrutiny
Bowers was a refusal to extend substantive due process rights not an invitation to "immunize
from constitutional review state conduct that would otherwise violate the [Constitution]");
Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (maintaining that where the Constitu-
tion is otherwise silent, traditional morality suffices as a rational basis for regulating private
consensual conduct).
49 Cain, supra note 26, at 1617.
50 Id.
51 Bruce, supra note 22, at 1144.
52 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This finding is an important one
because in the absence of a fundamental right or a suspect classification, courts will uphold a
law if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. This level of review,
known as rational basis, is the lowest form of scrutiny available and rarely results in the invali-
dation of a law. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
53 Padula, 822 F.2d, at 103.
54 The Court refused even to consider the Equal Protection Clause as a potential source
of protection for homosexual sodomy because "Respondent does not defend the judgment
below on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8.
55 See generally Amar, supra note 11.
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available,56 routinely failed 57-particularly in the military context.58
Thus, not only did Bowers eliminate the possibility of conduct-based
challenges, but in practice it effectively closed the door on status-based
equal protection challenges as well. 59 Individually, homosexuals had no
right to engage in sodomy (conduct) and collectively they had no claim
56 In equal protection jurisprudence, the Court generally employs three levels of review:
rational basis, heightened scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Rational basis review requires only that
a law be drawn to rationally achieve "a legitimate public purpose or set of purposes based on
some conception of the general good." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMRicAN CONSTrrtONAL LAW
§ 16-2, 1440 (2d ed. 1988). Heightened scrutiny, "a more penetrating" level of review than
rational basis, was "a judicial response to statutes creating distinctions among classes of resi-
dents based on factors the Court evidently regard[ed] as in some sense 'suspect' but appear[ed]
unwilling to label as such." Id. at § 16-3, 1445. Strict scrutiny, generally reserved for classifi-
cations implicating a suspect class or abridging a fundamental right, is "'strict' in theory and
usually 'fatal' in fact." Id. at § 16-6, 1451.
57 In the wake of Bowers, courts often took different tacks on the issue but came up with
essentially the same result: the Constitution provided no protected status for homosexuals. See
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003
(1990) (refusing to accept homosexuality as an immutable characteristic and concluding that
"after Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is con-
stitutionally infirm"); High-Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (while holding that the military's policy actually policed conduct not
status, the court concluded that the Army could "properly infer that plaintiff's lesbian ac-
knowledgment, if not an admission of (lesbian) practice, at least can rationally and reasonably
be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity to engage in homosexual conduct");
Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (find-
ing that homosexuals did not have the necessary characteristics of a suspect class). For a case
factually similar to Romer (but at the municipal rather than state level), see Equality Founda-
tion of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that homosexuals are not identifiable on sight unless made so by their own conduct), vacated
and remanded 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) [hereinafter Equality I1]. But See Watkins v. United
States Army 847 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (holding contrary to virtually all the other circuit courts that
"nothing in Hardwick suggests that the states may penalize homosexuals for their sexual
orientation").
58 The history of failed challenges to the military's anti-gay policies, the current version
of which is DADT (Don't Ask, Don't Tell), has been well documented. See supra note 57;
Bruce, supra note 22, at 124-33. Many have suggested that the failure to achieve any success
on this front is not surprising given that Bowers set the framework for the debate. See Nan D.
Hunter, Identity, Speech and Equality, 79 VA. L. Rv. 1695, 1717 (1993); see also Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 531, 543 (1992) (arguing that "[t]he
decision in Hardwick now bedevils virtually all litigation concerning lesbian and gay rights
claims").
59 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Equality II, 54 F.3d at 266; Ben-
Shalom, 881 F.2d. at 464. All these cases in one respect or another imported the Bowers
rationale into the equal protection realm to shut off homosexual rights challenges. See also
Courtney G. Joslin, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 225, 225 (1997) ("Despite Hardwick's
narrow holding that there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, lower courts have understood Hardwick to stand for the proposition that state-
endorsed discrimination against homosexuals is not constitutionally infirm.").
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to suspect or quasi-suspect status. 60 Absent either an overruling of Bow-
ers or a Supreme Court case explicitly addressing the question of equal
protection review for homosexuals as a class, the gay rights movement
was at a standstill.
II. ROMER v. EVANS
The entire history and development of constitutional challenges by
homosexuals may, or may not, have changed 6' on May 20, 1996 when
the United States Supreme Court declared:
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homo-
sexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado
cannot do. A state cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Colorado is affirmed.62
A. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court ruling in Romer marked the end of at least one
era63 in a long struggle that began when cities and municipalities in the
60 While generally true, this claim is not universally so. Commentators have been urging
some kind of suspect classification for homosexuals for years. See Kenton, supra note 23 at
896-97. The case described therein, Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of
Cincinnati, involved an amendment to the Cincinnati City Charter (known as Issue 3) that
passed by voter referendum 62% to 38% and read much like Amendment 2 in Romer. Equal-
ity Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 421-22 (S.D. Ohio 1994) [hereinafter
Equality 1]. The district court, after evaluating the traditional criteria of suspect classes, con-
cluded that "gays, lesbians, and bisexuals meet the requisite criteria for quasi-suspect status."
Id. at 440. While the court found that the amendment also implicated a fundamental right, and
thus subjected it to strict scrutiny, the court further insisted that "Issue 3 is not rationally
related to any legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 441. The Sixth Circuit, however,
reversed. See Equality 1I, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court then vacated and
remanded in light of Romer. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
[hereinafter Equality III]. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed the district court by
holding that Issue 3 was rationally related to a valid governmental interest. See Equality
Found. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3973, 94-4280, 1997 WL 656228, at *10-11
(6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997) [hereinafter Equality IV]. For more detailed discussion of the Equality
Foundation litigation see infra notes 149-57, 239-42 and accompanying text.
61 Precisely how much or how little has changed is the inkblot that is Romer and will be
the subject of later analysis. The inkblot reference stems from the similarities between the
psychological Rorschach Test and Romer v. Evans. In both cases, someone throws ink down
on a page and asks others what they see. The responses, inevitably, are extremely varied and
usually reveal more about the interpreters than the inkblot. So it may be for Romer which
provided little or no guidance and is now being interpreted in various peculiar ways-the
inevitable consequence of the Court's inkblot jurisprudence.
62 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (emphasis added).
63 Note, however, that as many have suggested, Romer is also the beginning of another
major battle. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, Romer v. Evans,
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state of Colorado first passed legislation banning discrimination based on
sexual orientation64 "in many transactions and activities, including hous-
ing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services.165 In May 1992, voters66 filed a petition with the Sec-
retary of State to amend the state's constitution to repeal these municipal
ordinances and prevent all future legislative, executive, or judicial action
at any level of state or local government aimed at protecting the named
class. 67 On November 3, 1992, that amendment, known simply as
Amendment 2, received 53.4% of the popular vote and passed into law.68
Soon thereafter, the litigation began.
On November 12, 1992, Richard Evans, eight other homosexuals
(including tennis star Martina Navratilova), one heterosexual woman
with AIDS, and various implicated municipalities filed suit in Denver
District Court to enjoin enforcement of Amendment 2 claiming that it
was unconstitutional. 69 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and granted the preliminary injunction pending the outcome of a trial on
the merits.70 The defendants l appealed and the Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err in granting the
injunction.72 The Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 2 in-
fringed upon a fundamental right7 3 and, therefore, remanded the case
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 106 YALE L.J. 247, 248 (1996) ("[Romer] ... is the beginning of a
story, not the end."); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 71 (arguing that the Court's "minimalist
approach" left many questions unanswered and has allowed for a massive struggle over the
meaning of the decision).
64 The municipalities defined discrimination based upon sexual orientation somewhat
differently. For example, the Boulder ordinance defined sexual orientation as "the choice of
sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual, or heterosexual." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 12-1-1 (1987)). Denver's ordinance defined it as "the status of
an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality." Id. (citing DEN-
VER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, art. IV, § 28-92 (1991)).
65 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, art. IV
§§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); ASPEN, CoLo., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER,
COLO., REv. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987)).
66 Amendment 2 was actually the brainchild of a group called "Coloradans for Family
Values" and its founder and chairman, Will Perkins. The group was the fundamental supporter
and promoter of the Amendment and waged a brutal and bruising campaign against opponents
who, by some accounts, outspent Coloradans for Family Values 2-1. See Daniel A. Batterman,
Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process, Levels of Generality, and Perceived Iden-
tifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 915, 933 (1995).
67 See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272. For specific language of Amendment 2, see supra note
2 and accompanying text.
68 See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272. The amendment was self-executing.
69 See id. at 1273.
70 See id.
71 The defendants were Colorado Governor Roy Romer, the Colorado Attorney General,
and the state of Colorado. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
72 See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1286.
73 The right in question, one derived from the voting rights line of cases, was a funda-
mental right to participate equally in the political process. See Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273
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with instructions for the trial court to determine whether Amendment 2
was (1) supported by a compelling state interest and (2) narrowly tailored
to meet that interest.74 The trial court, after considering the state's six
purported justifications for Amendment 2,7 5 concluded that it was not
supported by any compelling state interest and permanently enjoined its
enforcement. 76 The defendants appealed again and the Colorado
Supreme Court re-affirmed.77 Finally, the defendants appealed to the
United States Supreme Court which granted certiorari, heard oral argu-
ments and announced its decision on May 20, 1996.78
B. THE SUPREME COURT CASE
Justice Kennedy's opinion, although a mere six and one-half
pages,79 covered quite a bit of legal ground. He opened by quoting Jus-
tice Harlan's legendary dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson80 that the Constitu-
tion "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 81 Next,
Kennedy delved into the specifics of Amendment 2 and the Colorado
(1993); see also Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The
Emergence of A Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAuL L.
Rv. 841, 888 (1995); Seth Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is
There a Fundamental Right to-Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. Rnv.
445, 463-73 (1995).
74 See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1286; Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
75 The reasons given were:
(1) [D]eterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political func-
tions; (3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect
classes; (4) preventing the government from interfering with personal, familial, and
religious privacy; (5) preventing government from subsidizing the political objec-
tives of a special interest group; and (6) promoting the physical and psychological
well-being of Colorado children.
Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-40 (1994).
76 See Evans 11, 882 P.2d at 1340-41.
77 See id. at 1338.
78 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620.
79 In the Supreme Court Reporter at least. Romer is not yet published in U.S. Reports.
80 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
81 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559). Interestingly enough,
Kennedy's invocation of the legendary dissent may have gone too far. In recent years, Plessy
has become the rallying point for opponents of affirmative action because of Justice Harlan's
elegant plea for a "color-blind Constitution." By invoking this dissent, then, the Court has
given further intimations that the constitutional eradication of all affirmative actions programs
is near. See Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546
(S.D. Fla. 1996). "The Court wonders, in passing, whether more recent decisions of the
Supreme Court have completely closed the door on race-based classifications. In Romer v.
Evans . ... the Supreme Court appears to adopt Justice Harlan's famed dissent . . . If
this... truly is law, and not mere precatory rhetoric, no race-based classification can with-
stand constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 1556 n.11 (emphasis added). One prominent constitu-
tional scholar has also taken note: "[Kennedy's] opening reference in Romer to Justice
Harlan's famous color-blind dissent might seem to have far-reaching implications for the
highly-charged issue of affirmative action in education." Amar, supra note 11, at 223.
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court decisions. 82 Immediately after summarizing the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision, however, Kennedy halted that line of analysis alto-
gether: "We granted certiorari and now affirm the judgment, but on a
rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court. '83 Jus-
tice Kennedy then proceeded to explain the various potential legal
ramifications of Amendment 2 and the numerous state and federal laws
that would have been affected.84 Finally, Kennedy expounded on the
constitutional meaning of the case in a mere two and one-half pages. 85
Attempting to squeeze Amendment 2 into the Court's traditional equal
protection framework, Justice Kennedy appeared, as he had throughout
oral arguments, simply perplexed. 86 Kennedy conceded that "Amend-
ment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. '87 One para-
graph later he reiterated, "Amendment 2 confounds this normal process
of judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too broad. ' 88 Further
82 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623-24.
83 Id. at 1624 (emphasis added). Although often overlooked, this point is a substantial
one. The Supreme Court could have accepted the Colorado Supreme Court's rationale but did
not-indicating at the least that it had some misgivings about the decision. In truth, the differ-
ences between the opinions are striking. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized a "funda-
mental right" and then determined that the state of Colorado had failed to produce a
compelling interest with a narrowly-tailored remedy to meet that interest. The court did, how-
ever, speak of "substantial interest[s]" and intimated that the statute would have passed some-
thing less than strict scrutiny were it subjected to such. Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, at 1346.
Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court directly engaged and dismissed the Bowers di-
lemma: "The fact that there is no constitutionally recognized right to engage in homosexual
sodomy ... is irrelevant." Id. at 1350 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court,
however, (1) did not mention Bowers at all and (2) refused to accept the Colorado Supreme
Court's invocation of "strict scrutiny" for this challenge. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620. Unlike
the Colorado Supreme Court and its suggestions that Amendment 2 would have passed ra-
tional basis, though, the Supreme Court then said Amendment 2 failed even this lowest level
of scrutiny. See id. at 1629. In short, the Supreme Court deliberately refused to affirm either
the Colorado Supreme Court's Bowers analysis or its invocation of strict scrutiny, affirming
perhaps in name only.
84 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624-27. For a more thorough discussion, see supra note 12.
85 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29. While some might be inclined to praise the Court for
its rare brevity, the circumstances surrounding the case suggest otherwise. The Colorado
Supreme Court's finding of both strict scrutiny and a fundamental tight, the momentous
ramifications of the holding, the highly controversial nature of the issue and the Court's brand-
ing of nearly one million voters as irrational demanded a better and bolder explanation.
86 Indeed, it was not only Justice Kennedy but several justices who had appeared fasci-
nated at oral arguments by the unique range and scope of the law:
As Justice Kennedy pointed out... here, its everything-thou shalt not have access
to the ordinary legislative process for anything that will improve the condition of this
particular group-and I would like to know whether in all of U.S. history there has
been any legislation like this that earmarks a group and says, you will not be able to
appeal to your State legislature to improve your status. You will need a constitu-
tional change to do that.
Oral Arguments at *8, 1995 WL 605822, Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (No.94-1039) (emphasis
added).
87 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 1628.
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along, Kennedy asserted, "[t]he absence of precedent for Amendment 2
is itself instructive"8 9 and explained that "[flt is not within our constitu-
tional tradition to enact laws of this sort." 90
The Court's difficulty in applying its equal protection doctrine pro-
duced an opinion that stretched all the way from conventional equal pro-
tection jurisprudence-Yick Wo v. Hopkins91-to sui generis cases-
such as Shelley v. Kraemer.92 Put more succinctly, the opinion
floundered from one equal protection case to another-punctuated only
by attempts to respond to the dissent's arguments. Not until the final few
paragraphs did Justice Kennedy finally shed some light on the Court's
inner thinking and rationale. The many problems of fit, the sheer breadth
of the amendment, the constitutional entrenchment, and the discontinu-
ous relationship between the rationale and the law proposed all combined
to "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed [was]
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. '93 The Constitu-
tion does not tolerate mere animus as a rational basis for a law that seeks
simply to disadvantage a political class; therefore, Justice Kennedy con-
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo was one of the earliest and most famous equal protec-
tion cases. At issue was a refusal by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to grant a Laun-
dromat license to Yick Wo, a Chinese alien. Although the ordinance was neutral on its face,
such a disproportionate number of Chinese immigrants were being denied licenses "as to war-
rant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they [were] applied.., with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a
practical denial by the State of [equal protection]." Id. at 373. In the Romer context, Yick Wo
stood for the notion that "[tihe guaranty of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws."' Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369)). Not only is it
unclear what that means, but Romer and Yick Wo decisions are almost the polar opposites of
the equal protection spectrum. Yick Wo involved a neutral statute on its face that was applied
in a discriminatory manner. Amendment 2, by contrast, was nothing if not discriminatory on
its face: "[it] was a kind of legal and social outlawry in cowboy country-a targeting of outsid-
ers, a badge of second-class citizenship, a tainting of Queers, a scarlet Q." Amar, supra note
11, at 206. The issue was whether that discrimination was justified or permissible.
92 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley dealt with the issue of whether a state's enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant constituted state action for constitutional purposes. Despite hold-
ing in the affirmative, the case has been seriously weakened by subsequent rulings-perhaps
because the Court feared the logical extension of Shelley would be that nearly everything was
state action. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970); see also ROBE-RT H. BoRK,
THE TEaNG oF AmEmRICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUMCTON OF THE LAW 159 (1990) ("A case like
Shelley v. Kraemer has generated no subsequent decisions and is most unlikely to."). As a
result, Shelley is rarely cited for major propositions anymore, and has become more the subject
of legal process classes and philosophical debate than anything else. Here, it stands for the
ever lucid and wonderfully alliterative proposition that "Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Romer, 1620 S. Ct. at 1628
(quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22)).
93 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
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cluded that "Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause." 94
Romer, however, left Court watchers, judges, activists and others meticu-
lously pouring over its words and wondering precisely what the constitu-
tion will tolerate in this area.
HI. THE INKBLOT OF ROMER
While it is improbable that Romer will ever come to stand for any-
thing truly momentous in constitutional law, 95 three models have
emerged to explain the case's effects on Bowers and on the overall gay
rights movement. The first paradigm, as previously articulated, is that
Romer weakened Bowers or even overturned it "sub silentio. ' 96 The sec-
ond paradigm maintains that Bowers and Romer occupy entirely different
spheres of constitutional jurisprudence and, therefore, need not come in
conflict. The final model, which this Note ultimately adopts, is that
Romer stands merely for rational basis review in homosexual equal pro-
tection challenges and will, in the future, work side-by-side with Bow-
ers-each closing different constitutional doors on the gay rights
movement.
A. BowERs v. HARDWICX THE TERMINALLY ILL PATIENT
1. The Theory
The idea that the Court has overturned or soon will overturn Bowers
has several bases of support. First, the text of the opinion itself invites
such a reading. The majority's use of phrases like "animus toward the
class,"'97 "disadvantage... born of animosity," 98 and "bare... desire to
94 Id. at 1629. Perhaps, more than anything else in the opinion, it is this line that has
suggested the weakening, if not full overturning, of Bowers. A state's bare desire to delegi-
timize homosexual conduct no longer suffices as a rational basis. See Sunstein, supra note 16,
at 62 (contending that "at least for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer
legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply because the state wants to
discourage homosexuality or homosexual behavior."). Or as another prominent scholar put it,
"if the crux of the Romer holding is that laws 'born of animosity' toward homosexuals are
unconstitutional .. ., then the ruling 'is in very considerable tension with Bowers."' Richard C.
Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed?: Scholars Debate Whether past and Future Cases Will be
Affected by Supreme Court's Romer Decision, 82 A.B.A. J. 30 (July 1996) (quoting Laurence
Tribe).
95 "iT]his opinion is not the Roe v. Wade or Brown v. Board of the gay rights move-
ment." Reuben, supra note 94, at 30 (quoting Jay Sekulow, chief counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice). But see Joel Edan Friedlander, Justice Scalia's Kulturkampf, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES NEws, Vol. 1 No. I (Fall 1996) ( "Never before has the Supreme Court
equated a racial classification with laws prohibiting or disfavoring a type of sexual conduct.
This fact alone guarantees that Romer will be one of the few cases, such as Plessy, that will
always be required reading, whether or not it remains good law.").
96 Reuben, supra note 94, at 30 (quoting Doug Kmiec).
97 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
98 Id. at 1628.
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harm ' 99 to describe Amendment 2 appears to be a direct frontal assault
on Bowers and its legendary premise that "the law.., is constantly based
on notions of morality."'100 Second, Justice Antonin Scalia's scathing
dissent re-affirmed this interpretation of the text: "In holding that homo-
sexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court con-
tradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only ten years ago [in
Bowers]."''1 Third, a significant amount of legal literature concurs,
although perhaps for different reasons, with Justice Scalia's view that
Romer, at a minimum, severely undermined Bowers.10 2
Whether or not this analysis wins either one's head or one's
heart,103 it is a plausible analysis rooted in the very language and struc-
ture of the decision itself. First, the Court easily could have struck down
the statute under much stricter scrutiny, 1°4 but instead decided "Amend-
ment 2 fails, indeed defies, even [rational basis review]."' 0 5 The Romer
Court later defined this rational basis review stating, "a law will be sus-
tained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even
if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular
group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous."' 1 6 Additionally, the
Court cited'0 7 to Williamson v. Lee Optical'0 8 which set the standard for
rational basis review: "[it is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it."109 To say then, as the Court
99 Id. (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
100 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196; see also ROBERT H. BoRm, SLOUCHING TowARDs GOMOR-
RAH: MODERN LmERAISM A AMEicAN DECLNE 112-14 (1996).
101 Romer, 1620 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 While no author has directly pronounced Bowers to be dead, many have come close.
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996), 106 YALE L.J. 247, 252 (1996) (arguing that Romer is the forebearer of greater things
to come and suggesting indirectly that the Bowers rationale is on the way out); Reuben, supra
note 94, at 30; Sunstein, supra note 16, at 64-71. It is, if nothing else, of academic intrigue
that the intellectual firepower weakening Bowers is being generated by people spanning the
entire political spectrum. There are those, like gay rights activists, who think Bowers was a
hideous cancer on the Constitution and welcome its demise. Others like Justice Scalia, are
strong supporters of Bowers and cannot understand why it did not lead to a different result in
Romer-thus undermining its continued viability. See also William L. Armstrong, Court Jest-
ers, NAT'L Rv., Feb. 10, 1997, at 34, 35 (while not going so far as to declare Bowers dead,
arguing that "the Justices [in Romer] totally ignored their own ruling in the 1986 case of
Bowers v. Hardwicle').
103 "The initial consensus [on Romer] seems to be that while Justice Kennedy's language
soared, Justice Scalia's logic held. Justice Kennedy won their hearts; Justice Scalia, their
heads." Amar, supra note 11, at 204 (emphasis added).
104 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
105 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added).
106 Id. (emphasis added).
107 Id.
108 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
109 Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
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did, that Amendment 2 "defies" rational basis review is to suggest that
something truly rotten lies at the core of the legislation. That suggestion
is akin to Blackmun's assertion in his Bowers dissent that "[n]o matter
how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court,
we have held that '[mere public intolerance or animosity cannot consti-
tutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."' 110 In
fact, the similarities between Blackmun's Bowers dissent and Romer
strongly suggest that Bowers's days may be numbered.1 1 '
Second, Justice Scalia's dissent only affirmed the majority's implic-
itly harsh treatment of Bowers. Scalia argued for the direct application
of Bowers in Romer, but the more persuasively he argued, the more it
appeared that Bowers must, in practice, be dead. Specifically, Scalia's
most powerful statement on the intersection of the two cases came in
footnote two where he argued that the Colorado Supreme Court had pro-
nounced the provisions of Amendment 2 unseverable. 112 Specifically,
the Colorado court had determined that the four characteristics of homo-
sexuality described in Amendment 2113 were all ways of defining the
same class of persons. Consequently, Scalia argued, "if the entire class
affected by the amendment takes part in homosexual conduct, practices
and relationships-Bowers alone suffices to answer all constitutional ob-
jections." 1 14 If Scalia's analysis is correct (and the Supreme Court no-
where rejects the Colorado Court's interpretation), 115 then Bowers should
have led to a reversal of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision and an
110 Bowers, 478 U. S at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)) (emphasis added). In short, the question was not so much about the
relationship between the law and the goal (although Kennedy did call that relationship "dis-
continuous") but that the goal itself-disapproving homosexuality and homosexual conduct-
was, itself, improper, bad, illegitimate. See BORK, supra note 100, at 113 (arguing that the
Court's opinion in Romer suggests "all disapprovals [of homosexual conduct] are to be disal-
lowed as mere animus").
111 Consider also this quote: "A State can no more punish private behavior because of
religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus." Bowers, 478
U.S. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 n.2.
113 Those four characteristics were: "sexual orientation, conduct, practices and relation-
ships." Id. (quoting Amendment 2).
114 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court even has the power to disregard or supplant a
state supreme court's interpretation of a state statute under its own laws or constitution. For
guidance, see United States Constitution art. III § 2[2] and the Judiciary Act of 1789 limiting
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to cases involving matters of federal law only.
Clearly, this case involves a matter of federal law-the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
within that federal issue, the question is whether the Supreme Court can provide its own inter-
pretation of a state statute or must it defer to the state's interpretation. See Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (holding that the Supreme Court must accept as final
a state court's decision on matters of state law). But see Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,
303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (holding that the Court may review a state's substantive contracts law
in order that the Contracts Clause of the Constitution "not become a dead letter").
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affirmation of Amendment 2. But Romer struck down Amendment 2;
therefore, one of the three links in the logical chain-(1) Bowers is good
law, (2) Bowers. was on point, (3) the majority agreed that Bowers was
on point-must have broken down. Arguably, that link was the continu-
ing legal vitality of Bowers.
On a more general level, Justice Scalia also indicated that the Romer
majority had put its weight "behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."116 Simi-
larly, he extrapolated from the majority opinion a "pronounc[ement] that
'animosity' toward homosexuality.., is evil." 117 These suggestions, in
a much larger institutional sense, struck at the very essence of Bowers; in
short, moral condemnation of homosexual acts is no longer legitimate,
acceptable or constitutionally permissible to justify legislation. Under
Justice Scalia's reading of Romer, therefore, a state's bare desire to
delegitmize homosexual conduct is no longer a legitimate governmental
objective (as bias against African-Americans or Christians would not
be);" 8 it is itself a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Third, numerous legal commentaries suggest that "the two decisions
are inconsistent.., and as a result not much is left of Hardwick."' 19 As
professor Laurence Tribe, perhaps the nation's foremost constitutional
scholar, phrased it, "[[]f the crux of the Romer holding is that laws 'born
of animosity' toward homosexuals are unconstitutional .... then the rul-
ing is in very considerable tension with Bowers."' 20 If Bowers has not
been overruled, at the least "[its] force . . . may be somewhat
blunted... by Romer's indication of the mood of the Court."'121 Or, as
Professor Doug Kmiec summarized, "If Bowers remained good law, then
[Colorado] would have [had] a rational basis for the constitutional
amendment that was at issue in Romer."'122
More explicitly, three authors have devoted entire articles to map-
ping Romer onto Bowers and inspecting the remains.123 All three predict
the imminent demise of Bowers. One author prognosticates that Romer
will become for the gay rights movement what Reed v. Reed'24 was for
the women's rights movement-an initially limited victory based on ra-
116 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Id.
118 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 62 (contending that "at least for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class
simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual behavior").
119 Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 373, 374
(1997).
120 'Reuben, supra note 94, at 30.-
121 Id. (quoting Stanford Law Professor Kathleen Sullivan).
122 Id. (quoting Doug Kmiec of Notre Dame Law School).
123 See Grey, supra note 119; Joslin, supra note 59; Wolff, supra note 63.
124 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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tional basis review that eventually, "usher[ed] in the era of heightened
scrutiny." 125 Certainly, something historic has occurred in that, "[flor the
first time in its history, the Supreme Court has drawn a line that the state
may not cross in its treatment of gay people;" 126 it is not a stretch to
imagine the Court extending that line in the future. 127 A second author
describes Romer as finally smashing through the legal roadblock that was
Bowers v. Hardwick.128 More likely, Romer has at least foreclosed the
lower courts from "blindly rely[ing] on Hardwick to uphold the proposi-
tion that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally permissi-
ble."129 A third commentator, Thomas Grey, Professor of Law at
Stanford University, describes the logic and vitality of Bowers as being
slowly eroded by a contrary holding-if not by explicit reasoning. 130 Ir-
respective of their differences, all seem in agreement with the man who
lost the Bowers case that, "Bowers is 'not long for this world."131
2. The Effects
The practical effects of such a legacy would be monumental. Gay
rights advocates could once again introduce issues of gay conduct and
sexuality, dormant since Bowers, into the courtroom. 132 Present, and fu-
ture, anti-gay rights legislation would be dead on arrival. 133 Further, this
interpretation of a weakened or overruled Bowers would also strongly
bolster status-based claims of homosexuals in areas like civil rights, mili-
tary dismissals and elsewhere.134 While the gay-marriage issue is a fan-
tastically complicated one, a strong reading of Romer could certainly add
125 Wolff, supra note 63, at 250. Indeed, there are many similarities between the cases:
both were statutes struck down under rational basis review in the face of hostile precedent and
both could have been decided on different grounds.
126 Id. at 247. That a line was drawn at all is quite significant given that the Court had
refused to expand its laundry list of privacy rights when it came to homosexuals.
127 See id. at 252 ("[S]ilence, when properly deployed, can testify to a fundamental shift
in the Court's attitude toward discrimination against a disfavored group.").
128 See Joslin, supra note 59, at 225, 247.
129 Id. at 237.
130 See Grey, supra note 119, at 385-86.
131 Reuben, supra note 94, at 30 (quoting Laurence Tribe). If so, I am sure the irony will
not be lost on Tribe-the man who lost the Bowers decision. Romer may well begin the
movement to overrule Bowers, and the Court found nothing perhaps so persuasive in reaching
its decision as Laurence Tribe's Amicus Brief and its per se rule. See Wolff, supra note 63, at
249 n.12.
132 It is interesting to note that some commentators are already urging such a move, even
in spite of Bowers. See Bruce, supra note 22, at 1179-80.
133 This point is probably the least controversial, and the Supreme Court's recent decision
to vacate Equality I bolsters this argument irrespective of whether Bowers has been overruled
or not. See Equality III, 116 S. Ct. at 2519.
134 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (describing how Bowers was imported
into the equal protection realm and came to stand for the notion that homosexuals deserve only
rational basis review which, Romer aside, is a highly deferential standard).
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some much needed intellectual fodder to the discussion. 135 As Professor
Cass Sunstein has said, "[The Defense of Marriage Act] raises serious
issues under the equal protection component of the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Romer v. Evans."'136 Finally, if the framing of the entire legal debate for
the gay rights movement stems from its first devastating defeat in Bow-
ers,137 it is quite possible that the death of Bowers will become the mo-
ment of conception for a new, and ultimately successful, gay rights
movement.
3. Cases Supporting the Position
Three recent cases that help flesh out what this reading of Romer
would look like are: Nabozny v. Podlesny,138 Angelilli v. Consho-
hocken,139 and Equality 11I.140 While none of these cases goes so far as
to pronounce Bowers dead, they may be forbearers of its imminent de-
mise. In Nabozny, the defendants, public school officials, attempted to
rely on Bowers to justify fairly shocking and reprehensible treatment of a
homosexual student.141 The Seventh Circuit, however, found that reli-
ance to be misplaced for two reasons. First, Bowers dealt with conduct
and not status.' 4 2 In the court's words, "Bowers addressed the criminal-
ization of sodomy. The defendants make no mention of sodomy as a
motive for their discrimination. To the contrary, the defendants offer us
no rational basis for their alleged conduct."' 43 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, Romer now precludes reliance on Bowers: "Of course
Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the
135 Once, or if, the gay-marriage debate filters down past the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and Congress's power thereunder (e.g. Congress recently passed the Defense of Marriage Act
which purports to give states the power to refuse recognition of same sex marriages granted by
sister states) it may well be that courts will have to decide if recognizing same-sex marriages is
against a state's strong public policy. Evidence of such a policy would presumably be derived
from sources like anti-sodomy laws or laws similar to Amendment 2. To the extent these laws
are not constitutionally permissible, they cannot be used as evidence. See BoMr, supra note
100, at 112 (acknowledging that against state policy arguments often succeed, but suggesting
"[t]he Court's response [to such arguments] is in some doubt because it has recently shown a
tendency to view homosexuality as a matter of required moral indifference under the
Constitution").
136 The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 44 (1996) (statement of Cass Sunstein).
137 See Hunter, supra note 58, at 1717.
138 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
139 No. Civ.A. 96-3391, 1996 WL 663871 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1996).
140 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (vacating and remanding judgment in light of Romer).
141 See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451-53 (detailing the horrific harassment, abuse and violence
that Nabozny was subjected to at the hands of his peers and the complete unresponsiveness of
the school's administrators).
142 See id. at 458.
143 Id.
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Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans."'144 Although the court did
not explicitly cite Romer as precedent for reversing the summary judg-
ment that the lower court entered against Nabozny's equal protection and
due process challenges, 145 "[Romer] bolster[ed] [its] analysis to some
extent."1'46
The second case, Angelilli, while not directly confronting the issue
either, granted tacit support to the idea that Romer severely weakened
Bowers. The plaintiffs in Angelilli "urge[d] the court to ignore Bowers
.. , claiming it was an aberration that has been subsequently 'reversed'
by the Supreme Court [in Romer]."'147 Although the court did not adopt
that specific language, it did deny the defendant's motion to dismiss the
intimate association/privacy claims against him which were based, in
part, upon this broad reading of Romer.148 In short, it refused to say that
Romer did not overrule Bowers.
The third case of note, Equality III, involved an amendment (Issue
3) to the Charter of Cincinnati that denied certain rights to homosexuals
as homosexuals in a manner similar to Amendment 2.149 The crucial
differences between the amendments, for the purposes of this analysis,
are in the language1 50 and the governmental level at which they were
enacted. 15 1 The district court in Equality I deemed homosexuals a quasi-
suspect class, subjected the ordinance to intermediate scrutiny, and inval-
idated it under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.152 The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion that reads something like
Scalia's dissent in Romer, upheld the ordinance under rational basis re-
144 Id. at 458 n.12.
145 Nor did the court describe, in any detail, the manner in which Bowers will soon be
"eclipsed."
146 Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458 n.12.
147 Angellili, 1996 WL 663871 at *4.
148 See id. at *3.
149 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
150 The precise language was as follows:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides
that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct or relationship con-
stitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of
minority or protected status quota preference or other preferential treatment. This
provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance,
regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the
foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Cincinnati City Charter Art. XII.
151 Amendment 2 was a statewide referendum and Issue 3 applied to the city of
Cincinnati.
152 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. 417.
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view.153 The court of appeals's reasoning was two-fold: (1) because
"homosexuals are generally not identifiable... on sight unless they elect
to be so identifiable by conduct... they cannot constitute a suspect class
or a quasi-suspect class;"'1 54 and (2) the statute in question was constitu-
tional even if "status-based" because it "imposes no punishment or disa-
bility . . .but rather merely removes previously legislated special
protection against discrimination."' 155 On writ of certiorari, however, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Romer.156
That the Supreme Court vacated and remanded (irrespective of the
ultimate outcome) suggests that Romer might have an impact, at the very
least, on Issue 3 and other referendums. Scalia's highly unusual dissent
from the grant of certiorari also supports the idea that the Court's vacat-
ing of the judgment extends Romer:
[T]he consequence of [Romer's] holding is that homo-
sexuals in a city (or other electoral subunit) that wishes
to accord them special protection cannot be compelled to
achieve a state constitutional amendment in order to
have the benefit of that democratic preference.... Thus,
the consequence of holding this provision [Issue 3] un-
constitutional would be that nowhere in the country may
the people decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord
special protection to homosexuals. 157
In other words, what nearly all commentators and even the parties to
Romer had accepted-that neither municipalities nor states were consti-
tutionally mandated to pass antidiscrimination laws based on sexual ori-
entati on' 58-was now in question as well.
Although these cases do not a reversal of precedent make, one can
see the broad outlines of Bowers's erosion. As Tobias Wolff points out,
the Court has drawn a line in the sand for the first time.' 59 The mood
and tone, if not the strict holding, could well lead to the eclipsing of
Bowers. Although it is hard to imagine the Court taking another homo-
sexual sodomy case, it may not even be necessary.
153 See Equality II, 54 F.3d 261; see also Kenton, supra note 23, at 886 (reviewing the
history of the case and outlining the argument for quasi-suspect status).
154 Equality II, 54 F.3d at 267.
155 Id. at 267 n.4.
156 See Equality III, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). In Equality IV, the Sixth Circuit once again
upheld Issue 3 as consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Equality IV, 1997 WL 656228,
at *10-11.
157 Equality Foundation 111, 116 S. Ct. at 2519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158 'But surely the cities were not constitutionally obliged to pass these private discrimi-
nation codes. The federal Constitution generally does not require that the government prohibit
private discrimination.... [and] repeal is no different from failure to enact." Amar, supra note
11, at 206-07.
159 See Wolff, supra note 63, at 247.
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4. Difficulties Inherent in Such a Reading
There are several problems with this line of analysis. First, few
cases of the stature and infamy of Bowers are overruled by mere implica-
tion.160 Lower courts were not left floundering for years in the 1950s
questioning whether Brown v. Board of Education 61 overturned Plessy
v. Ferguson.162 The Court made it clear. Given the weight and prece-
dential value of Bowers on so many types of litigation, 163 the Court could
not truly hope to avoid the political firestorm that overruling Bowers
would entail yet achieve the same result de facto. The result is highly
unlikely to come about de facto, and if Bowers is no longer good law the
Court would say so. Second, there is little about the Rehnquist Court
that suggests either sensitivity to, or sympathy for, the gay rights move-
ment.164 Third, the Court has done little to articulate any guiding princi-
ples by which lower courts could invalidate laws previously validated by
Bowers.1 65 In a sense, the Court identified the law in question as
unique-it was too narrow and yet somehow overbroad and it altered the
political process in a way that made it too difficult for advocates of gay
rights. 166 Therefore, it could not in any way be rationally related to an
identifiable governmental purpose. This logic may be sufficient for a
Supreme Court holding, 167 but Romer is not the kind of opinion from
which judges can readily extrapolate that the mighty Bowers is dead. 168
B. BOWERS V. HARDWICAR DISTINGUISHED FROM ROOMER
1. The Theory
A second school of thought contends that the Romer majority cor-
rectly omitted Bowers from its decision because Amendment 2 did not
directly implicate what was at issue in Bowers: homosexual conduct. Far
from silently overruling Bowers then, the Court merely distinguished it.
160 The Court's failure to engage the Bowers question was particularly noticeable given
Scalia's repeated references to it, including "Bowers alone suffices to answer all constitutional
objections." Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1633 n.2.
161 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
162 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
163 See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
164 Two members of the Court, Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, joined in Scalia's wither-
ing dissent which, although far from being an attack on homosexuals, was also far from sym-
pathetic. Furthermore, O'Connor was in the majority in the Bowers decision and Kennedy and
Souter are both generally moderates on "cultural" issues.
165 Which brings us back to the title of this Note. Courts may see something in Romer
that calls these laws into question, but few will agree about what they see.
166 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
167 The Supreme Court need not do more than decide live cases and controversies under
Article III; it is under no legal obligation to provide broad guidelines for the lower courts.
168 Empirical evidence for this statement does exist. Although some judges have taken
tepid steps in that direction, no one has yet declared the overruling of Bowers.
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The ideological father of this reading is Professor Akhil Amar of Yale
Law School and his most recent article entitled, "Attainder and Amend-
ment 2: Romer's Rightness."'169 Discussing the majority's treatment (or
lack thereof) of Bowers, Amar writes:
Look here, Justice Kennedy is saying. There is all the
difference in the world between legislative deprivations
based on status and punishments based on conduct. To
think otherwise is terminally silly (though Kennedy is
far too polite to say so bluntly). Thus, whether or not
certain forms of sexual conduct may be criminalized-a
question the Court need not and therefore does not
reach-mere orientation cannot be criminalized or used
by law to disenfranchise or degrade. 170
This argument concerning the distinction between status and con-
duct is re-enforced by the related notion that the two cases invoked two
separate and historically dissimilar clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: the Due Process Clause (Bowers) and the Equal Protection Clause
(Romer). Because the two clauses occupy two very different spheres in
constitutional law,171 the cases need not directly implicate one
another. 172
These somewhat general distinctions find particular validation be-
cause the Court in Bowers dealt solely with the act of homosexual sod-
omy173 and explicitly refused to engage any equal protection issues. 174
Seen in this light, Justice Kennedy's failure to mention Bowers is not a
failure at all.175 Romer was an equal protection case and Bowers was a
substantive due process case. Bowers dealt with persons engaging in a
criminally proscribed act while Romer dealt with depriving a class of
people certain, albeit somewhat benign, political rights. Moreover, as
Amar writes, "one need not cite a case to distinguish it; and in a deft
paragraph Justice Kennedy explains how Bowers-far from being the
169 Amar, supra note 11.
170 Id. at 228.
171 "[A]s it has come to be understood, the Equal Protection Clause is tradition-correcting.
Whereas the Due Process Clause is generally tradition-protecting." Sunstein, supra note 16, at
67.
172 See id.
173 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 (expressing no opinion on "the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy"); Bruce, supra note 22, at 110-11 (arguing
that the Court's obsessive focus on homosexual sodomy was misguided and allowed them to
evade difficult questions).
174 See Bowers 478 U.S. at 188 n.2, 196 n.8.
175 Kennedy's silence has been referred to as "principled" or representing the "minimalist
approach." Sunstein, supra note 16, at 64-69; Wolff, supra note 63, at 252. In this context, it
may well be that he is silent because one does not discuss cases that are not on point.
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'case most relevant'-is a case not remotely relevant." 176 Thus, accord-
ing to Amar, Kennedy distinguished Bowers by stating:
Davis v. Beason, . . . not cited by the parties but relied
upon by the dissent, is not evidence that Amendment 2 is
within our constitutional tradition, and any reliance upon
it as authority for sustaining the amendment is mis-
placed.... To the extent it held that the groups desig-
nated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote
because of their status, its ruling .. .[is] most doubt-
ful .... To the extent that Davis held that a convicted
felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not
implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable. 17 7
There stands Bowers then, alive, well, and distinguished.
2. The Effects
What Professor Amar does not seem to realize is that the effects of
such a holding would be enormous. Sodomy would cease to be the un-
severable link between homosexuals as a group and their legal identity.
Sodomy, quite simply, would no longer constitute "the behavior that de-
fines the class."178 Further, all the cases that relied on such logic, 179
importing Bowers into the equal protection realm, would be called into
question. There would be new potential for civil rights cases, same sex
marriages, and challenges to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" dis-
charge policy. 180 Finally, although courts would still not have much gui-
dance on the appropriate level of review for homosexuals' equal
protection challenges, or on the question of whether homosexuals consti-
tute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, at least the courts would know how
not to analyze these claims: against the backdrop of Bowers. In short,
Bowers would no longer be the Monster in the middle of Maple Street-
a towering and hideous beast allowing none to pass along the arduous
road to homosexual rights.
176 Amar, supra note 11, at 227.
177 Id. at 227-28 (quoting Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628) (citations omitted).
178 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
179 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
180 Whereas the impact of such a reading can never be precisely gauged (particularly
given the ferociously complex nature of certain issues like same-sex marriages), generaliza-
tions can, indeed must, be made. At a minimum, the court's statement in Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990), that "[aifter
Hardwick, it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitu-
tionally infirm" is no longer true. Bowers is not a carte blanche invitation for discrimination
against homosexuals in all areas of law.
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3. Cases Supporting the Position
Perhaps the strongest empirical evidence that Bowers has been dis-
tinguished and a new standard in equal protection jurisprudence has ar-
rived is the recent district court case of Swage v. Inn Philadelphia and
Creative Modeling, Inc.181 Swage centered, in part, on the issue of
whether Title VII covers same-sex sexual harassment.' 82 For a variety of
legal reasons,'183 the court refused to adopt the bright line rule that same-
sex sexual harassment is never actionable; included in the court's ration-
ale was Romer with all of its ideological trappings.184 While Swage did
not discuss Romer in its larger textual analysis, the court used Romer as
an important weapon in beating back "the absolutist approach that same
sex harassment is never actionable."' 185 Romer, the court argued, man-
dated that "homosexuals cannot be denied protection against discrimina-
tion available to all others."'186 While it is not entirely clear how the
court discerned this holding from the ever-ambiguous Romer decision, 187
it is clear that Romer provided further firepower to a court already sym-
pathetic to homosexual rights. In this context, the Supreme Court's va-
cating of Equality 11188 appears sharper as well. Perhaps Bowers is good
law, but state laws that seek to classify individuals by a single character-
istic (homosexual sodomy) and then deny them political protections
across the board' 89 are subject to some sort of searching scrutiny.190
181 No. Civ.A. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996).
182 Id. at *I.
183 These reasons include the ambiguous wording of the statute (including the term sex),
the indeterminate legislative history and the general illogicality of the interpretation that same-
sex harassment is never actionable. See id. at *2-*3.
184 Certainly the direct legal issues were not analogous but found common ground in the
notion that "to conclude that same gender harassment is not actionable under Title VII is to
exempt homosexuals from the very laws that govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals."
l at *3 (quoting Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., Inc., 1995 WL 241855
(E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995)).
185 Id. at *3.
186 Id.
187 In a sense the Court actually seemed to say the opposite in Romer. Homosexuals
could be denied the same rights accorded to all others. Certainly Congress has never extended
civil rights to homosexuals and no one has suggested that this policy is under fire after Romer.
Further, even sympathizers of the decision maintain that this reading cannot be right. "But
surely the cities were not constitutionally obliged to pass these private discrimination codes.
The federal Constitution generally does not require that the government prohibit private dis-
crimination." Amar, supra note 11, at 206.
188 Equality III, 116 S. Ct. 2519; see supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
189 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29.
190 While the court technically applied the lowest level of review available, rational basis,
some commentators have described the scrutiny that the Court applied as "rational basis with
bite." Bruce, supra note 22 at 111 n.64. Still other authors have analogized it to "active"
rational basis review probing the record and minds of legislators to make sure animus is not
afoot (although as the author points out there is no record to probe in a referendum). See
Delchin, supra note 99, at 14; see also William M. Wilson m11, Romer v. Evans: "Terminal
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The distinction between punishing conduct and classifying by sta-
tus, then, is alive and well. Furthermore, homosexual equal protection
challenges have potential, at the very least in regards to overbroad laws
similar to Amendment 2 (Equality) and perhaps even in other areas like
civil rights (Swage). While not explicitly expanding the notion of homo-
sexual rights through a stricter standard of review or suspect/quasi-sus-
pect status, Romer symbolizes the inception of a much broader but
somewhat ill-defined movement to strengthen homosexuals' equal pro-
tection challenges. 191
4. Difficulties Inherent in such a Reading
While intriguing at points, this reading is not the strongest or most
persuasive interpretation of Romer. Although it is true that a court need
not name a case to distinguish it,192 more than silence is usually
needed.193 Because it was dealing with precedent as well-known and
powerful as Bowers, the majority needed to delineate something more
than a vague feeling or premonition that this law in question was wrong
or weird 194 to have any serious hope of evicting the Bowers rationale
from the equal protection realm. 195
Silliness, " or Enlightened Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L. Rav. 1891, 1930 (1997) (maintaining
that the Court's use of active rational basis review parallels the earlier case of City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). In some sense, it is not unlike the level of
review under the Administrative Procedure Act for agency rulemaking and adjudication.
191 There is much evidence to suggest that the present Court is very suspicious of laws
that seek to categorize and/or exclude certain groups. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (condemning VMI's all-male admissions policy); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (invalidating a Department of Transportation regulation giving special preferences to
minority owned businesses).
192 See Amar, supra note 11, at 227.
193 Particularly when one considers that nearly all legal commentators (as well as the
dissent) discussed Bowers in the wake of Romer. In essence, the majority was virtually the
only group that did not address the issue in some way.
194 Indeed, among the many theories, arguments and ideas the Court refused to overtly
adopt was the notion of a "per se" violation outlined in an Amicus Brief by Laurence Tribe.
Amicus Brief, Romer, 116. S. Ct. 1620, Brief of Laurence Tribe et al., 1995 WL 862021 (No.
94-1039). Tribe's complex and well-reasoned analysis appears to have greatly influenced the
Court. However, the only portion of the brief that the Court explicitly adopted was Tribe's
statement that: "Never since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment has this Court con-
fronted a measure quite like Amendment 2-a measure that, by its express terms, flatly ex-
cludes some of a state's people from eligibility for legal protection from a category of
wrongs." Id. at *3. This quotation translated loosely into the Court's assertion that Amend-
ment 2 "is not within our constitutional tradition .... [and] is itself a denial of equal protection
of the laws in the most literal sense." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. At a minimum, Tribe's brief
fueled the Court's ongoing fascination with the uniqueness of Amendment 2.
195 Particularly when everything about the decision smacked of sui generis and the Court
applied only rational basis review with no fundamental right and no suspect classification. It
would be asking too much for a lower court to see this reading through to its eventual conclu-
sion when it is unclear that the Supreme Court knows what its eventual conclusion is.
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Further, numerous lower court rulings over the years conflating sta-
tus and conduct exacerbated the need for the Court to engage the issue
more directly.196 Mere admission of homosexual orientation or of a ho-
mosexual marriage has been sufficient in military cases to indicate a pro-
pensity to engage in homosexual conduct, which in turn has been
sufficient to justify a discharge.' 97 Professor Amar may call such reason-
ing "most troubling,"' 98 but it has prevailed in the lower court opin-
ions. 199 Perhaps, as Professor Amar argues, there is a world of
difference between status and conduct and Bowers does not apply to sta-
tus-based equal protection challenges, but the Court never acknowledged
or discussed the numerous rulings to the contrary. Indeed, it is telling
that Amar2 ° appears to think them almost entirely inconsequential. 201 In
short, it simply requires too great of an intellectual leap of faith to extra-
polate that Romer, which does not even mention Bowers or the case law
that sprung from it, distinguished Bowers.
Finally, delving even further, one of the several explanations Pro-
fessor Amar offers for the Court's silence seriously undermines his argu-
ment about Bowers being distinguished: "[Plerhaps some Justices in the
majority still approve of Bowers and would resist an explicitly negative
'but see' citation. °202 If the citation would be explicitly negative then
Romer is contradicting, not distinguishing, Bowers. Morevoer, if some
justices in the majority thought Romer contradicted Bowers, then, as Jus-
tice Scalia maintained, they deliberately ignored direct precedent. At the
very least, the Court's failure to respond to Scalia .was insufficient to
counteract the logical and legal precedents supporting his position, and
we are left looking for a more plausible reading of Romer's impact on
Bowers.
196 See supra notes 57-59.
197 This line of reasoning is what Scalia was getting at when he wrote: "If it is constitu-
tionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitution-
ally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631. Although Scalia was not referring to the military line of cases, the
comparisons are obvious, and he does cite military cases like Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632.
198 Amar, supra note 11, at 231.
199 See supra note 57-58.
200 To the extent under this reading that we are inclined to believe that Amar is thinking
like the Court.
201 Amar devotes only one half of a footnote to mentioning the many "lower court opin-
ions [that] collapse the obvious analytic distinction between homosexual orientation and ho-
mosexual conduct." Amar, supra note 11, at 235 n.124 (emphasis added).
202 Amar, supra note 11, at 205 n.234.
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C. BOWERS & ROMER AS SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS 2 0 3 OF THE GAY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE MOST VIABLE OPTION LEFr
1. The Theory
In what is developing into not only a surprise but a constitutional
tale rich with irony,2°4 Romer v. Evans, initially celebrated as a major
victory for the gay rights movement,205 may well have become the pro-
verbial nail in the coffin of the very same movement. Although scholars
disagreed for years about whether the rationale and underpinnings of
Bowers extended to the Equal Protection realm,20 6 they generally agreed
on what would resolve the dispute: (1) a direct overruling of Bowers or
(2) a Supreme Court case involving an equal protection challenge based
on homosexuality. 20 7 This section deals with Romer in the latter context
and details its devastating effects on the gay rights movement. 20 8
The Romer fact-pattern may have provided Court watchers with the
scenario they wanted: a Supreme Court case involving an equal protec-
tion challenge based on homosexuality. 20 9 Interestingly, the Court re-
203 The reference is to the two hideous monsters who harass Odysseus on his way through
the Straits of Messina. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Doubleday &
Company Inc., 1961).
204 This legal tale is actually rich with many ironies. One of which can be found in the
similarities between Romer and the historic case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
cited by the majority opinion in Romer. See supra note 92. Romer is beginning to look some-
thing like Shelley in that it was initially heralded as something of a landmark case for a partic-
ular class but the holding eventually became limited to its particular set of facts. It is unlikely
that this is the proposition for which the Supreme Court cited Shelley. But cf. Board of County
Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court has portrayed decisions like Romer as "sui juris" as well but really they represent "a
major, undemocratic restructuring of our national institutions and mores.").
205 See Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme Court Storytelling,
the Culture War and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345, 34748 ("media and
academic spin doctors have proclaimed Romer as a landmark victory for gay rights"); David A
Kaplan and David Klaichman, A Battle, Not the War, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, at 24; Linda
Greenhouse, Gay Rights Laws Can't Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TuMms, May 21,
1996, at Al.
206 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
207 See Kenton, supra note 23, at 873. It was thought to be particularly helpful for the
Supreme Court to enunciate the appropriate level of review for, and status of, homosexuals as
a class. Id.
208 It is interesting that Romer was the case taken by the Court instead of the more note-
worthy Equality II, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). Most people thought the latter case had a
better chance for a grant of certiorari given that the district court had found homosexuals to be
a quasi-suspect class deserving of intermediate scrutiny. See Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 440.
Because the "Court has never addressed whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class," Equality I seemed ripe for review. Kenton, supra note 23, at 873. The Court's
decision to hear Romer, then, lends further credence to the idea that the Court was not inter-
ested in deciding a landmark case for the homosexual rights movement.
209 If nothing else, this case might become that one case because (1) it is only the second
case the Supreme Court has heard on homosexual rights and (2) the Court is generally reluc-
tant to take on cases that would place itself as a combatant in America's "Culture Wars."
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jected the Colorado Supreme Court's finding of a "[fundamental] right to
participate equally in the political process" '210 and its subsequent demand
that the state produce a compelling interest to justify the infringement. 211
The Supreme Court, therefore, declined a convenient opportunity to side-
step the direct question of homosexual rights and, thus, likely cemented
their opinion as a weighty (if ambiguous) decision in the area of homo-
sexual rights.212
Outside of its narrow holding that Amendment 2 violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided few
things of import. It did, however: (1) refuse to recognize a fundamental
right,213 (2) decline to extend any type of suspect status to homosexu-
als,214 and (3) apply mere rational basis review.215 It is the latter two
acts that may become the true legacy of Romer.
210 Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
211 "We granted certiorari and now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different from
that adopted by the State Supreme Court." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
212 As a result the case left the Supreme Court as more of a gay rights case than it was
when it entered. Such a move is all the more monumental given that the issue of homosexuals
rights is the more complicated, thorny and emotionally charged issue. See generally Rabkin,
supra note 4, at 4 (invoking Scalia's use of Kulturkampf as a starting point for a discussion of
America's culture wars and the manner in which the Court has consistently shown up "on the
side of elite opinion, which is to say, liberal opinion"); Joel Edan Friedlander, Justice Scalia's
Kulturkampf, in REL IIous LIBERTS NEws, Vol. 1 No. 1 (Fall 1996) (arguing that the major-
ity in Romer has taken a strong position in the culture wars and conservative justices must,
rather than adopt neutral principles, aggressively pursue culturally conservative positions to
counteract the force of the liberals on the Court).
213 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 n.1, (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And the Court implicitly
rejects the Supreme Court of Colorado's holding ... that Amendment 2 infringes upon a
'fundamental right' of 'independently identifiable class[es]' to 'participate equally in the polit-
ical process."') (quoting id. at 1624).
214 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( "The trial court rejected the respondents' argument that
homosexuals constitute a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class, and respondents elected not to
appeal that ruling to the Supreme Court of Colorado."). The failure to outline any sort of
suspect status is telling given that the Court had declined the fundamental right invitation.
Thus, the law in question could only be subjected to rational basis review. "[l]f a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classifi-
cation so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627
(citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-2643 (1993)).
215 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-1629. For an extended comparison between traditional
rational basis review and the rational basis review applied in Romer, see supra notes 103-111
and accompanying text. See also Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sum-
marizing that the "Court evidently agrees that 'rational basis'-the normal test for compliance
with the Equal Protection Clause-is the governing standard."). The Court seemed to have
painted itself into something of a comer here because laws rarely fall to pass muster under
rational basis review. See TRmE, supra note 56, at 1442-43 (1988); GEOFFREY R. STONE Er.
AL., CoNsTrrrmoNAL LAW 541 (2nd ed. 1991). Furthermore, once the Court established ra-
tional basis as the standard, the path ahead looked particularly thorny for a variety of reasons.
First, the rationale proffered by the state seemed rational under a traditional Bowers ap-
proach-especially given that the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the statute as not sever-
able in the way it classifies homosexuality. "[If that premise is true-if the entire class
affected by the Amendment takes part in homosexual conduct, practices and relationships-
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Considering Romer in all its complexity, one must keep in mind that
the Court did not explicitly declare "homosexuals are not to be consid-
ered a suspect class" or, alternatively, "there is no fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process." It simply did not affirma-
tively announce either proposition. Nor did the Court decide that rational
basis review was the proper scrutiny for either homosexuals' equal pro-
tection challenges generally or even this law specifically. Instead, the
Supreme Court simply said, "the principles [Amendment 2] offends...
are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental purpose... and Amendment 2 does not. '216
Thus, at a minimum, Romer changed nothing; it yielded no new legal
rules or standards. At the maximum interpretation, however, the
Supreme Court's silence indicated that rational basis review is appropri-
ate for equal protection challenges based on homosexuality and that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
2. The Effects
If Romer stands for the propositions that homosexuals do not consti-
tute a suspect class and their equal protection challenges are subject to
rational basis review, the effects will be subtle yet profound.217 Under
such a reading, on the one hand Romer would merely be rubber-stamping
the status quo. On the other hand, given the adverse case law and the
hopes that had been pinned on this case, the Supreme Court's preserva-
tion of the status quo would be significant indeed. Certainly, the current
military policy would stand up under rational basis review as it has for
years-and there is already evidence that this is happening.218 Questions
Bowers alone suffices to answer all constitutional objections." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 n.2
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, Amendment 2 would likely have passed a rational basis test if
subjected to such by the Colorado Supreme Court. See supra note 83. Third, the law looked
rational on its face and, even more, one could imagine other conceivable justifications for the
law not proffered. See generally Delchin, supra note 99, at 14 (arguing that it is virtually
impossible for courts to discern voter motivation on referendums, thus making it virtually
impossible in theory for the Court to invalidate referendums under rational basis review).
216 Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1629. The implication being if it doesn't pass even this bare
minimum requirement, the Court need not specify the appropriate level of review.
217 Given that the status/conduct distinction was a major force for pro-gay rights liti-
gators, the Court may have severely dashed their hopes.
218 The rationale given by the military has stood up to rational basis review for years and
is likely to continue doing so-especially given that the newest policy is the most lenient in
years and only establishes a rebuttable presumption of homosexual conduct for those admitting
to be homosexuals. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1995); Phillips v. Perry, 106 F. 3d 1420
(1997) (upholding the military's policy even in the wake of Romer); see also Richenberg, infra
note 223 (strongly doing the same); Warren L. Ratliff, Case Note, "Upholding 'Don't Ask,
Don't Tell,"' Thomason v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 1996 WL 396112 (U.S.
Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-1), 106 YALE L.J 531, 531 (1996) ("This Case Note argues that consti-
tutional challenges to the DADT [Don' Ask, Don't Tell] policy have little chance of success
under the current standard of review.").
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of civil rights would also likely come out no differently without an ex-
plicitly higher standard of review or further congressional guidance on
the subject.219 Although Romer does perhaps bolster the argument for
making same-sex discrimination actionable, it is only in a very vague and
attenuated way. Even for laws similar to Amendment 2, Romer casts
little doubt on their continued validity.220 Finally, the issue of gay mar-
riage is highly complicated, but such a legacy for Romer would likely
have few significant effects on that debate either.221
3. Cases Supporting the Position
Several recent federal cases outline the possibility that Romer stands
for three basic legal propositions: (1) homosexuals are not a suspect
class; (2) there is no fundamental right to participate equally in the polit-
ical process; and (3) rational basis is the appropriate standard of review
for homosexuals' equal protection claims. Three of these relevant cases
are: Hyrnda v. United States,222 Richenberg v. Perry,223 and Equality
!V.224 While the first two cases exhibit some nuanced differences, both
involve essentially the same issue-involuntary discharge under the mili-
tary's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy225-and both draw on Romer for
intellectual firepower. Equality IV, in contrast, is noteworthy primarily
for the impact Romer did not have.
In Richenberg, the plaintiff, a United States Air Force Member, was
honorably discharged from the military after "informing his commanding
officer that he [was] homosexual. ' 226 His central argument was that "10
U.S.C. § 654(b) [federal statute authorizing the military policy] and
DOD Directive 1332.30 [the military policy] violate the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, and particularly its equal protection compo-
219 Currently, the issue is ambiguous at best as to what Congress intended by the term
"sexual discrimination." The legislature would have to speak loudly and clearly because Con-
gress, traditionally, as Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, has repeatedly been explicit in its
refusal to enact civil rights legislation baged on sexual orientation. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1637 (noting the "more plebeian attitudes that... still prevail in the United States Congress").
220 See supra notes 60, 239-42 and accompanying text.
221 See Duncan, supra note 205, at 357 (citations omitted) ('The case for conventional
marriage laws may be debatable, but it is neither irrational nor invidious. And Romer is n'o
threat to the heterosexual paradigm of civil marriage."). But see supra note 135.
222 933 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
223 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997).
224 Equality IV, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3973, 94-4280, 1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. Oct. 23,
1997).
225 See Hyrnda, 933 F. Supp. at 1049-50; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260. "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" is the military's most recent, and likely most lenient, anti-homosexual discharge policy.
The policy, which became effective on October 1, 1993, directs the military to refrain from
inquiring into the sexual orientation of recruits and service members in addition to curtailing
military investigations into the sexual habits of its service members. See Policy Guidelines on
Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces.
226 Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260.
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nent,2 2 7 by adopting an irrational and 'constitutionally repugnant'
presumption that discriminates against homosexuals on the basis of their
'status."' 228 In other words, the plaintiff directly challenged the mili-
tary's ongoing policy of equating homosexual status with homosexual
conduct.
The court, however, was not particularly sympathetic to
Richenberg's arguments. It rejected his argument that the court "should
apply heightened scrutiny because homosexuality is a suspect classifica-
tion. '22 9 As authority for applying rational basis review, the court cited
"[f]ive other circuits [who had] declined to give heightened scrutiny. ' 3 °
Making it clear that it was referring to homosexuals as a class, the court
also cited Romer: "The Supreme Court applied rational basis review in
reviewing a state constitutional amendment adversely affecting homosex-
uals . . .- 231 Interestingly, the next cite was to Bowers!232 After it
established this low level of review, the court held that "given these ra-
tional concerns [residential living, troop morale, etc.], Congress and the
President may rationally exclude those with a propensity or intent to en-
gage in homosexual acts. ' 233 In short, upholding the military's policy
became a mere formality. 234
In Richenberg, then, the Eighth Circuit used Bowers and Romer to-
gether to apply rational basis review to an equal protection challenge
based on homosexuality. Romer was directly on point but Bowers still
provided support. Eventually, Bowers may disappear entirely from the
equal protection realm leaving only Romer, isolated from its holding,
upholding the principle of rational basis review in equal protection
challenges.
Although Hyrnda-a related, but somewhat less complex, military
discharge case-did not address the more difficult legal issue of whether
227 Some, like this author, would question the rationality of the Due Process Clause hav-
ing a silent equal protection component, but thus is the legacy of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954), and it has not been questioned in years.
228 Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 260. These included Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (en bane);
Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the
Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984). These are the very cases the Supreme Court refused to
consider in Romer, but obviously still present formidable opposition and will not be overruled
or challenged by implication alone.
231 Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260 n.5.
232 See id.
233 Id. at 262.
234 "In conducting rational basis review, we presume that the statute and implementing
Directive are valid, placing the burden on Richenberg to show that they are not rationally
related to any legitimate government purpose." Id. at 261; see also supra note 54.
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a mere declaration of homosexual orientation (as was the case in
Richenberg) is sufficient to support a discharge, 235 it did indicate that
Romer altered no legal principles or rules in the military context. The
military discharged the plaintiff in Hyrnda not simply for an admission
of homosexual orientation, 236 but also for admitted homosexual con-
duct.237 In applying mere rational basis review, the court cited all the
federal circuits (under the military's older but similar policy) as well as
Romer: "The United States['s] constitutional promise that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the law co-exists with the realization
that most legislation classifies for one reason or another, resulting in dis-
advantage to various groups or persons. ' 238 While nothing historic, this
case re-emphasized the point that Romer is unlikely to affect the mili-
tary's policy. If anything, it appears strengthened.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit's most recent pronouncement in the
Equality Foundation odyssey provides perhaps the strongest evidence
that Romer will be limited to its specific facts leaving behind only a
damning legacy of rational basis review for homosexual equal protection
challenges. 239 The question of how far Romer would reach was always a
matter of contention, but most scholars thought it would at least impli-
cate other laws that looked like Amendment 2. In Equality IV, however,
the Sixth Circuit said, in effect, maybe not. Reconsidering the case on
remand from the Supreme Court and in light of Romer, the Sixth Circuit
held nonetheless that "the salient operative factors which motivated the
Romer analysis and result were unique to that case and were not impli-
cated in [Equality 11."240 The Cincinati City Charter Amendment was
less constitutionally suspect for two reasons: (1) it was significantly less
restrictive than Amendment 2 and (2) its realm of application was much
narrower. Citizens throughout the state will not have to lobby their legis-
lators, as would have been the case after Amendment 2, to pass a consti-
tutional amendment in order to seek access to their legislature. In
distinguishing Romer, the Sixth Circuit wrote: "In essence, the high
Court resolved that a state constitutional amendment which denied
235 The court did not need to reach the issue because the plaintiff had admitted not only to
being a homosexual but to committing homosexual acts--conduct that was certainly grounds
for dismissal even under the most sympathetic of court precedent. See Hyrnda, 933 F. Supp. at
1052-53.
236 The court defined a homosexual as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in,
desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Hyrnda, 933 F. Supp. at 1050
(quoting DOD Dir. 1332. 14 Pt. 1 § H(1)(b)(1)) (This statute is now known as the military's
"old policy.").
237 See id. at 1052. The conduct is what allowed the court not to have to reach the more
difficult issue of equating status with conduct.
238 Id. at 1052 (citing Romer).
239 Equality IV, 1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997).
240 Id. at *4.
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homosexuals any opportunity to attain state law protection, even from
municipalities or other local entities within that state which desired to
accord them special legal rights, could not be justified .... 241
Even more telling than the impact Romer did not have in Equality
IV, however, was the impact that it did have on the case. In Romer, the
Sixth Circuit observed, the Court "resolved that the deferential 'rational
relationship' test, that declared the constitutional validity of a statute or
ordinance if it rationally furthered any conceivable valid public interest,
was the correct point of departure for the evaluation of laws which un-
likely burden the interests of homosexuals."'242 Amazingly, then, Romer
did influence Equality IV but rather than compelling the invalidation of
Issue 3 by force of logic, Romer directly led to a second upholding of the
amendment by cementing rational basis review as the appropriate stan-
dard of review for Equality IV and many homosexual rights cases to
come.
Of course, two of the cases discussed above are military cases-and
courts' deference to the military is legendary 243-while the third in-
volved unique circumstances not likely to repeat. Nonetheless, an out-
line of Romer's legacy is beginning to emerge in the lower courts and it
looks very small indeed.
4. Difficulties Inherent in Such a Reading
Although Bowers and Romer working side-by-side to defeat due
process and equal protection challenges is conceptually the strongest
reading,244 it is far from flawless. The points of vulnerability are essen-
tially three-fold. First, the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Romer
was that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the most basic level then, the Court affirmatively
limited the manner in which states can treat homosexuals. While it may
be that this constitutional mini-splash will produce only imperceptible
ripples, the burden of proof would seem to remain on those trying to
241 Id. at *9.
242 Id. at *3. Although the Sixth Circuit did discuss the possibility that the Supreme
Court applied an "'extra-conventional' application of equal protection principles," that appli-
cation had "no pertinence to the case [at hand]." Id. at *6. Further, the Sixth Circuit, as a
practical matter, appeared to be applying traditional rational basis review.
243 "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and mili-
tary affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (upholding the military's policy of selecting
only men for duty through the selective service) (emphasis added); see also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1944) (upholding as a wartime necessity the military's World War
II order of a specific curfew for persons of Japanese ancestry); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the forced relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the
West coast to internment camps during World War I1).
244 Emerging victorious in some sense as the least weak reading.
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limit Romer not on those suggesting it might implicate other laws or
other areas of law. Only time, and of course further litigation, will tell
just how far, if at all, the ripples will spread. Second, the Supreme Court
in Romer never explicitly established rational basis review as the appro-
priate standard for homosexuals' equal protection challenges; it merely
invalidated Amendment 2 under the lowest scrutiny necessary.245 Thus,
extracting "rational basis review" out of Romer is questionable. Finally,
given the highly ambiguous and complex nature of Amendment 2, it is
difficult to make any accurate predictions as to precisely what other laws
Romer will affect. Caution is to be held in the highest regard.
CONCLUSION
In Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court upheld a deci-
sion of the Colorado Supreme Court that struck down a 1992 Colorado
state referendum banning homosexual preferences. Beyond that, Romer
is nothing if not ambiguous. Perhaps it was because of the strange nature
of the law. Perhaps it was because of the controversial nature of the
subject matter. Perhaps it was because the Justices themselves could not
agree on anything more substantial than a holding. Whatever the cause,
the result was inkblot jurisprudence.24 6
From that inkblot, three separate models or readings of the case, and
its impact on the homosexual rights movement, have emerged: (1) Romer
overruled Bowers; (2) Romer distinguished Bowers; (3) Romer and Bow-
ers will work side-by-side to defeat different constitutional challenges by
homosexuals. Each reading is viable and any of the three may emerge as
the predominant legacy of Romer in the future. Nonetheless, the notion
that Bowers and Romer will work side-by-side-warts and all-seems
the strongest and most logical at this point. Given no other legal building
blocks to work with, lower courts, even those sympathetic to the gay
rights movement or the status/conduct distinction often urged by gay
rights advocates, may well have to conclude that Romer will strike down
little more than laws that look like Amendment 2. Taken to its logical
extreme, the case may even act as a vindication of the lower courts' prior
policy of importing Bowers into the equal protection realm to deny ho-
mosexual rights challenges or, at the least, to subject them to the lowest
scrutiny possible. If any new or different life is to be injected into the
case, the Supreme Court will once again have to grant certiorari and de-
245 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 61.
19971
202 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:165
cide another case or controversy. Until then, lower courts will be left
interpreting the inkblot.
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